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Abstract
Scholars and critics often lament that corporations rule the world, but pre-
dominant accounts of global governance imply almost the opposite: With
theories populated by national governments and intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organizations, it might appear that nearly everyone ex-
cept corporations writes the rules that govern across borders. This article
compiles research on the varied ways in which multinational and transna-
tional corporations have shaped global governance, drawing attention to the
contours and limits of corporate power. Corporations can be seen variously
as sponsors, inhibitors, and direct providers of global governance.They have,
for example, been sponsors of neoliberal trade rules, inhibitors of some labor
and environmental regimes, and providers of private standards for finance,
safety, sustainability, and human rights. Scholars may be tempted to focus
on just one of these roles or to presume unified corporate dominance, but it
is important to grapple with all three and to investigate the conditions under
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INTRODUCTION
The rise of transnational corporations (TNCs) has challenged national forms of regulation, shifted
governments’ trade and fiscal priorities, and spawned new forms of private authority. Yet corpo-
rations are rarely in the foreground in theories of global governance—at least as something more
than intended targets of global rules. National governments are the central players in most the-
ories in political science, whether these focus on the evolution of cooperation or realist power
politics (Kahler & Lake 2003, Keohane 2001). Constructivists have added epistemic communi-
ties of experts, international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), global civil society, and
other nonstate actors (Boli & Thomas 1999, Finnemore & Sikkink 2005). Economic interests are
often assumed to shape governments’ negotiating positions, but actual corporations are usually
relegated to the background. As the study of international organizations evolved into the study
of global governance, the list of relevant actors expanded (Weiss & Wilkinson 2014), but much
research on global governance continues to resemble an alphabet soup of international treaties,
UN agencies, and INGOs.
In political sociology, there is a long tradition of research on corporations and public policy,
but nearly all of this is focused on the national level, and mainly on the United States (Akard 1992,
Domhoff 1990, Mizruchi 2013, Prechel 2000). Reviewing research on the political mobilization
of firms and industries, Walker & Rea (2014) accordingly focus almost entirely on the American
context. Sociological accounts of global governance, in turn, have focused mainly on INGOs and
the structure of theworld polity (Beckfield 2003, Boli&Thomas 1999,Hughes et al. 2009, Schofer
& Longhofer 2011) or on global social movements and transnational advocacy (Bandy & Smith
2005, Stamatov 2013).
This article pulls together strands of research that can help us better understand the influence of
corporations on global governance. Some of the relevant research comes fromoutside of sociology,
mainly from corners of political science that have attended to corporate mobilization for or against
global regimes. This includes neo-Gramscian perspectives on international relations (e.g., Fuchs
& Lederer 2007, Levy & Newell 2005), comparative politics research on the interests of firms
within and across the varieties of capitalism (e.g., Woll 2008), and some firm-centered strands
of international political economy research (e.g., Greenhill et al. 2009, Phillips &Weaver 2010).
There is, to be sure, a variety of relevant material in sociology as well. This includes debates about
a transnational capitalist class (e.g., Robinson 2014), research on the construction of neoliberalism
(e.g., Chorev 2007, Quark 2013), theories of transnational professional and regulatory fields (e.g.,
Dezalay &Garth 2002, Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson 2006, Quack 2010), and accounts of corporate
social responsibility and sustainability projects (e.g., Bartley 2018, Tsutsui & Lim 2015).
Drawing from research on a range of subfields and topics, I argue that corporations have
played threemain roles in the drama of global governance—sponsor, inhibitor, and provider. First,
multinational and transnational corporations have actively sponsored (and partially devised) some
international regimes. This is clearest in the global rise of neoliberalism and its institutionalization
in trade agreements. Second, corporations have inhibited the expansion of global governance in
other arenas, mobilizing to defeat or defang rules pertaining to labor, environment, and health
and safety, for instance. Third, corporations have become direct providers of global governance,
as seen in the rise of transnational governance and private regulation. Here, corporations are
not pushing for or against intergovernmental agreements but rather pushing private standards for
safety, sustainability, technical specifications, and human rights through their global supply chains.
Identifying these three roles helps us to organize an array of relevant research (shedding light on
neoliberalism, environmental policy, financial governance, and other topics along the way) and to
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transnational capitalist class or a divided set of competing national economies, sociologists need to
pay closer attention to the vehicles throughwhich companiesmobilize, the conditions underwhich
they are more unified or divided, and the circumstances in which they effectively capture global
governance or accept significant compromises. In addition, rather than trumpeting just one of
these roles—highlighting corporations’ private provisionof sustainability andhuman rights norms,
for instance—scholars should inquire into the other two. A company may be providing private
governance while working to inhibit more stringent intergovernmental standards or sponsoring
global trade rules that restrict what governments can do.
By “global governance,” I mean sets of relatively formalized rules, standards, agreements,
and/or administrative bodies that seek to establish order and solve problems across numerous
national jurisdictions.While some equate global governance with nearly all forms of international
and transnational ordering (seeWeiss &Wilkinson 2014), mymore restricted definition is helpful
for organizing a diverse literature and clarifying key processes of corporate influence. The myriad
of corporate influences on social and economic life around the world—through marketing and
media, franchise operations, foreign direct investment (FDI), and supply chain management—are
in some instances relevant to my focus on global rules, but a full accounting of these influences
goes beyond the scope of this review.
Global governance was never as state-centered as the literature would make it seem, but it
has become especially important to focus on TNCs. The rise of global value chains (GVCs) has
enabled companies to coordinate production across national borders while keeping their high-
value design and marketing activities in affluent countries—or perhaps in offshore tax havens
(Davis 2009, Gereffi 2005, Seabrooke &Wigan 2017). This transnational structure of production
is one reasonwhy intergovernmental approaches face new challenges andwhy activists have turned
to the private sector for reforms, making GVCs into infrastructures for the flow of rules (Bartley
2018). Analytically, there is growing interest in moving beyond methodological nationalism in
macrosociology (Wimmer&Glick Schiller 2002). States and national boundaries remain essential,
but we should also not let a nationalist data infrastructure, with governments as cases, define the
research agenda.
NATIONAL, MULTINATIONAL, AND TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS IN SOCIOLOGY
The earliest corporations were essentially transnational, in the form of colonial trading companies
such as the Dutch East India and English East India companies (see Erikson 2014). But the rise
of the integrated industrial corporation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries happened
mainly within national borders, producing powerhouses such as U.S. Steel, General Motors,
Renault, and Siemens. By the mid-twentieth century, many companies had expanded their foreign
investments to becomemultinational corporations (MNCs), such asRoyalDutch Shell, theUnited
Fruit Company,DowChemical, andCoca-Cola (and see Elmore 2015 for an interesting corporate
history). Scholars of international business have typically theorized multinational expansion as a
way for large firms to exploit the capabilities they have developed at home or protect their market
positions as product cycles make domestic manufacturing uncompetitive (Dunning & Rugman
1985). American banks followed their clients abroad in the 1960s and 1970s, until the third world
debt crisis and a wave of consolidation left just a handful of highly globalized financial companies
(Mizruchi & Davis 2004).
Increasingly, global firms have taken the formof networkedTNCs, which have extensive global
reach but much more limited foreign investments. As unwieldy global conglomerates collapsed
and financial markets pushed firms to shed all but their core competencies (Davis et al. 1994), a
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supply chain revolution made it possible for many industries to rely more on global sourcing than
on joint ventures (Gereffi 2005). TNCs such as Nike, Apple, Wal-Mart, IKEA, and H&M built
their fortunes by nimbly managing networks of independent contract manufacturers. National
corporations and integrated MNCs remain, and there is some debate about the amount of change
in international trade (Hirst et al. 2009), but there should be little doubt that production—and,
to a lesser degree, corporate governance—has been reorganized on a transnational scale in many
industries (Dicken 2015).
Development and Economic Sociology
Thirty years ago, one would have found MNCs occupying central positions in sociological re-
search. Quantitative research inspired by dependency theory asked whether MNC penetration—
that is, FDI relative to total investment—affected economic growth and inequality in developing
countries (Bornschier&Chase-Dunn 1985). Firebaugh’s (1992) critique opened up amethodolog-
ical morass and highlighted the challenge of unpacking closely intertwined measures in small sam-
ples of countries over limited periods of time. Still, evidence mounted that FDI tends to increase
economic growth, but it also promotes income inequality up to a point (likely by initially distorting
labor markets and displacing workers through technological change) (Alderson & Nielsen 1999)
and stunts economic growth when countries rely heavily on a single source of investment (Kentor
& Boswell 2003). More recently, researchers have extended this tradition to additional outcomes,
asking how FDI shapes environmental degradation, for instance ( Jorgenson et al. 2007).
While quantitative research sought to infer the effects of corporations, a wave of case study
research in the 1980s shed light on howMNCs actually navigated developing countries. As Evans
(1979) put it, “Corporations remove control over production from those engaged in production;
multinationals extend the alienation across political boundaries” (p. 35). His account of dependent
development in Brazil highlighted a triple alliance ofMNCs, domestic firms, and the authoritarian
state that promoted a productive though inequitable form of growth. Research by Bradshaw (1988)
in Kenya and by Gereffi (1983) in Mexico similarly highlighted the strategies of MNCs and their
varied alliances and conflicts with the state and domestic industry.
The growth of economic sociology in the 1990s brought intensive scholarly attention to the
corporate form in the United States. Examining the nineteenth-century origins and twentieth-
century transformations of American corporations, sociologists built the foundations for political,
cultural, and relational alternatives to efficiency theories in economics (Berk & Schneiberg 2005,
Dobbin 1994, Fligstein 1990, Roy 1990). But economic sociology has paid relatively little attention
toMNCs and TNCs, with several notable exceptions. These include Guillen’s (2001) research on
the divergent globalizing paths of multinational business groups in Spain, Argentina, and South
Korea; Kristensen & Zeitlin’s (2005) account of how anMNCwas cobbled together fromDanish,
British, and American firms; and Bandelj’s (2009) research on the growth of FDI in Central
and Eastern Europe. Research on the varieties of capitalism sometimes examines multinational
firms, but almost always with an emphasis on national institutional complementarities in the home
country rather than the effects of global operations (Hall & Soskice 2001).
The strategies of networked TNCs have been most widely studied in the multidisciplinary
literatures on GVCs and global production networks. Here, TNCs are analyzed as lead firms in
the construction and coordination of complex global outsourcing systems. Specifically, scholars
in these traditions have, for example, analyzed the role of large retailers in globalizing apparel
production (Appelbaum & Gereffi 1994); identified distinct modes of coordination in the pro-
duction of fresh vegetables, electronics, clothing, and bicycles (Gereffi et al. 2005); and argued
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innovation and upgrading in East Asian electronics manufacturing (Yeung 2014). “Governance”
in this literature primarily means the coordination of supply chains rather than the structuring of
political authority (Gereffi & Lee 2012), but it is notable that scholars in this tradition were also
among the first to draw attention to the rise of private global standards (Barrientos 2000, Gereffi
et al. 2001), which is discussed in the section below titled Providers: The Rise of Private Authority.
A Transnational Capitalist Class?
Finally, a provocative literature on the transnational capitalist class has argued that TNCs are
the backbone of a unified class of investors, capable of demanding forms of global governance
that facilitate the accumulation of wealth and manage the endemic crises of capitalism (Robinson
2014, Sklair 2000). By this account, what appear to be distinct and competing national economies
are actually tied together by interlocking directorates, cross-national (and concentrated) corporate
ownership, global business associations, and supply chain linkages.Much of the empirical research
in this tradition is highly structural, using network analysis to document growth in interconnect-
edness among the largest global companies (Carroll 2010, Kentor & Jang 2004).
Only rarely have scholars tried to assess whether these structural ties generate unified political
action. In one recent contribution, Murray (2017) connects transnational interlocks with contri-
butions by corporate political action committees (PACs) in the United States. While banks have
lost their role as unifying agents in the American corporate community (Mizruchi 2013), Murray
finds evidence that other types of interlocks and transnational ties—especially to an inner circle of
internationally connected corporate directors—are associated with unity in the PAC contributions
of the world’s largest companies. Focusing on transnational policy planning networks rather than
American politics, Carroll & Sapinski (2010) find a relatively small but important inner circle of
business leaders, mainly European executives, who are well-connected to both corporate boards
and transnational policy boards (e.g., the International Chamber of Commerce, World Business
Council for Sustainable Development). This research shows clear infrastructures for coordinated
political action, but it also remains possible for competitive concerns to fragment corporate com-
munities in action.
Rather than investigating processes of mobilization or the exercise of structural power, the
transnational capitalist class literature often relies on a Marxist style of functionalism: Because the
transnational capitalist class needs supranational organizations to manage crises, a transnational
state [composed of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization
(WTO), and other organizations] has arisen to fulfill the need (Robinson 2001). This is obvi-
ously insufficient if one wants sociological explanations to account for processes, mechanisms,
sequencing, or paths not taken (Gorski 2004, Roy 1990). In reviewing evidence about corpora-
tions as sponsors, inhibitors, and providers and global governance, I seek to highlight processes
of influence as much as possible. Moreover, I propose that the political coherence and power of a
transnational capitalist class is situational, with episodes of global rule-making activating national
rivalries to different degrees.
SPONSORS
Corporations and the Neoliberal Project
While some might suspect that TNCs are averse to global rules, they have been enthusiastic
supporters and architects of some types of rules, and even of stringent enforcement by govern-
ments and intergovernmental organizations. This can be seen most clearly in the construction of
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neoliberalism—that is, a set of ideas and policies focused on removing barriers to international
trade, expanding the reach of markets, and reducing democratic intrusion into market operations.
There is a burgeoning sociological literature on neoliberalism (see Centeno & Cohen 2012), but
it has taken a decidedly political and cultural turn. Some scholars emphasize governments and
international financial institutions (the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) that have
pushed privatization, trade openness, and other neoliberal reforms (Fourcade-Gourinchas&Babb
2002, Prasad 2006). Others highlight communities of intellectuals behind the neoliberal project,
from the Mt. Pelerin society of libertarian intellectuals to the networks of economists puzzling
over planning (Bockman & Eyal 2002, Mirowski & Plehwe 2015, Salles-Djelic 2017). These ac-
counts are important, but they should not obscure the role that corporations have played in the
construction of neoliberalism, particularly at the global level.
The liberalization of international trade—through the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and eventually theWTO—happened largely because of the actions of globalizing
American corporations, including financial, computing, and consumer products companies. As
analyzed by Chorev (2007), this segment of American companies was able to outmaneuver com-
panies demanding protection from cheap imports (e.g., steel and textile producers) and turn the
US government into an advocate of global neoliberalism. Starting in the early 1970s, executives
from Chase Manhattan Bank, IBM, General Mills, and other MNCs used vehicles such as the
Committee for a National Trade Policy and the Emergency Committee on American Trade to
push the US government to reduce trade barriers, pacify opponents with selective protectionism
for special cases, and shift trade policy from the legislature to the executive branch, where protec-
tionists had less access. Later, companies such as Texas Instruments, Boeing, and Monsanto led
the lobbying to expand the GATT and form the WTO to legalize dispute resolution and further
remove trade policy from the US Congress (Chorev 2007).
As the WTO was being formed, a handful of companies led the effort to incorporate strin-
gent intellectual property protection rules. “In effect, twelve corporations made public law for the
world,” Sell (2003, p. 96) argues, referring to the CEOs of twelve American companies—including
General Electric, Du Pont, Monsanto, Merck, and Procter and Gamble—who had essentially de-
vised the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
Starting in the mid-1980s and working through an ad hoc Intellectual Property Committee, these
CEOs captured the ear of US trade policy makers, mobilized their peers in Canada, Europe, and
Japan, and pushed for enforceable intellectual property protections in the GATT. The group
acted nimbly and overcame opposition from developing countries, ultimately getting “95% of
what it wanted” in the TRIPS agreement, including strengthened WTO dispute settlement and
the possibility of criminal procedures against violators (Sell 2003, p. 55).
While US-based firms have loomed especially large in the neoliberal project, European firms
have also embraced and helped to globalize it. In the early 1980s, the executives of 17 major
European companies, led by the CEOof Volvo, formed the European Roundtable of Industrialists
to promote European market integration and revitalize the region in the face of competition from
Japan and the United States. As described by Van Apeldoorn (2000), this group gradually shifted
from a neo-mercantilist to a neoliberal agenda as new members joined (e.g., Shell, BP, Unilever)
and the currency union took on a life of its own. By the mid-1990s, the Roundtable had become an
avid proponent of the WTO and source of neoliberal policy prescriptions within Europe. Some
European companies underwent their own transformation during this period, from champions
of their national variety of capitalism to aggressive TNCs. As Streeck (2009) recounts, after
Daimler became the first German company to be traded on the New York Stock Exchange in
1993, it steered away from social partnerships and coordinated capitalism and, after merging with
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We should not assume universal corporate control of global economic governance, though.
American insurance and financial firms led the charge for a General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices, and service sector companies in Europe gradually came on board as well (Woll 2008). But as
Sell (2003) shows, the final agreement was much weaker than its corporate backers wanted, leav-
ing some routes for governments to discriminate against foreign service providers. Similarly, the
corporate backers of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures could not overcome
divergences with their governments or opposition from civil society. Sell argues that the large
industry associations that led the charge in these two cases were less nimble than the CEO group
in the TRIPS case. Notably, ad hoc CEO groups were central to the efforts studied by Chorev
and Van Apeldoorn as well.
In a different way, Quark’s (2013) account of the global cotton trade likewise reveals an uneven
relationship between corporations and neoliberal trade rules. American cotton producers stood to
lose from the liberalization of the cotton trade, but they managed to navigate the global market
by teaming up with the US government and transnational cotton merchants to effectively turn
their quality grading system into the global standard. Once the WTO was created, though, their
ascendant rivals in China were able to contest the American standards system and promote their
own alternative. This left transnational merchants and US government agencies scrambling to
reconstitute their authority and ultimately promoting something like “U.S. standardswithChinese
characteristics” (Quark 2013, p. 182). As Quark argues, TNCs have clearly driven the expansion
of neoliberalism, but their power is contested, and new rivals have “gained growing power through
the creative dynamics of the US-led liberal market project” (p. 226).
Moreover, there may be settings in which corporations are secondary in the promotion of
neoliberal trade architectures. Fairbrother (2014) argues that in affluent countries, companies have
been important in seeking the expansion of markets and removal of trade barriers. In less affluent
countries, though, technocratic experts in government, backed by the authority of economics and
ties to international financial institutions, have been more important. Examining the construction
of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Fairbrother shows that large companies
and business associations in the United States almost universally supported NAFTA as a way to
institutionalize trade, investment, and access to low wage labor in Mexico. As Dreiling (2000)
shows, the Business Roundtable, an association of American CEOs, was especially important in
structuring this consensus across industry lines. In Canada, the business community gradually
embraced trade liberalization—largely to improve access to the American market—as it became
more domestically-owned, expansionist, and organized by a Business Roundtable-like group (the
Business Council on National Issues). In both countries, economists had their own rationales
for supporting NAFTA, but these were sidelined as government officials embraced rationales
developedby thebusiness community. InMexico, in contrast, the government’s interest inNAFTA
can be traced to dependence on international financial institutions, domestic political changes,
and the technocratic economic experts they empowered. Many Mexican industries did embrace
neoliberal reforms, as analyzed by Gates (2008), but they were following rather than leading the
government and technocrats, Fairbrother argues.
Globalizing Preferences
Beyond trade agreements, there are a variety of examples of corporations sponsoring—and
shaping—intergovernmental regimes. An elite club of experts, the Group of 30, has helped fi-
nancial corporations globalize their preferred versions of securities and derivatives regulation.
The club, which brings the leaders of large financial corporations (e.g., Merrill Lynch, Santander,
Barclays, Deutsche Bank) together with academic experts, central bankers, and public sector
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officials, has produced agenda-setting studies and best practice standards that have been taken
up by intergovernmental bodies such as the International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Tsingou 2015).1 Multinational law firms,
especially those based in the United States, have played key roles in the development of both the
human rights and commercial arbitration fields, as research by Dezalay & Garth (1996, 2002)
documents. Silicon Valley technology firms—including Google, Facebook, and Intel—have re-
cently amped up their lobbying and convinced US trade representatives to push a digital free trade
agenda that combats the so-called digital protectionism that China, Brazil, and others have used
to foster domestic companies (Azmeh & Foster 2016).
In addition to expanding their markets and protecting their assets, companies are often seen
as supporting global or regional governance in order to gain competitive advantages, harmonize
divergent national regimes, or level the playing field against less-regulated competitors (see Bruszt
&McDermott 2014, Vogel &Kagan 2004). Farrell &Newman (2014) argue that when companies
operate in multiple jurisdictions, they will press for global standards that reduce the uncertainty
of competing and fluctuating rules. As an example, they point to the role of banks in supporting
data privacy rules, which were eventually taken up by the European Union (EU), that mediated
between American and European approaches. One can also point to the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the 1987 intergovernmental agreement that phased
out chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). It was supported by companies such as DuPont and Imperial
Chemical Industries that had invested in alternatives to CFCs and saw a global ban as a way to
gain advantages over their competitors (Murphy 2004). Importantly, though, we see in the next
section some circumstances in which companies have resisted the globalization of rules even when
leveling rationales were plausible.
INHIBITORS
There is little doubt that companies have inhibited the development of global governance in
some arenas, particularly with regard to labor rights, climate change, hazardous substances, and
corporate taxation. Despite talk of harmonization, TNCs often profit from taking advantage of
cross-national regulatory differences, whether by gravitating to sourcing destinations with lax
enforcement of labor and environmental laws or by setting up shop in tax and investment havens
(Berliner et al. 2015, Mayer & Phillips 2017, Seabrooke & Wigan 2017). In addition, companies
generally resist rules that would limit their autonomy, and they can use both lobbying and the
threat of exit to undermine them.
Specifying exactly what has been inhibited and how, though, is more difficult. Scholars typically
focus on governance arrangements that have emerged, rather than looking for failed cases or
the watering down of rules over time. Additionally, it is usually easier to observe government
representatives negotiating final versions of treaties than corporate actions prior to that point.
The structural power of mobile TNCs over immobile nation-states—and the chilling effects this
can have on policy preferences—are substantively important but methodologically difficult to
capture. Nevertheless, some research does show how companies have hindered global rules or
pressed for less stringent, less binding, or more narrowly defined versions. Indeed, looking at how
corporations have mobilized against global rules also sheds further light on the conditions under
which they will promote or accept particular versions.
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Trade, Labor, and Human Rights
TNCs have endorsed voluntary principles on business and human rights (see the section below
titled Sustainability and Labor Standards), but they have worked to derail instruments that might
include binding penalties or extended legal liabilities. In themid-1970s, a wave of debates about the
ethics of corporate investment in developing countries spawned several guidelines and a proposed
United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, which some advocates hoped
could have legally enforceable provisions. Negotiations dragged on as developing countries split
into factions, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries developed
their own voluntary guidelines, and multinational companies became increasingly hesitant about
even a nonbinding code (Sauvant 2015, Tapiola 2015). As this code effort failed, a wave of bilateral
investment treaties arose in its place, providing protection to MNCs’ assets without imposing
additional responsibilities on them.
By the early 1990s, labor and human rights advocates were calling for a social clause, which
would link labor rights and access to the globalmarket, to be added to theGATTand subsequently
the emerging WTO. Unlike the successful linkage of trade and intellectual property rights de-
scribed above, the call to link trade and labor rights was soundly rejected by the WTO at the
Singapore meeting of 1996 and again at the Seattle meeting of 1999. Scholars have pinned the
outcomemainly on opposition from governments, employers, and unions in Asia, who feared pro-
tectionism from affluent countries (Kolben 2006). But researchers have not asked the comparative
question of why the positions of developing countries proved more successful in this case than in
many other WTO negotiations.
There is evidence of direct corporate mobilization against some other global human rights
instruments. In particular, companies have mobilized against an obscure US law, the Alien Tort
Claims Act, which has been used to sue companies in American courts for violations of interna-
tional law. In 1996, human rights groups helped villagers in Burma sue Unocal over violence and
repression surrounding a pipeline project, and this was followed by cases againstChevron and Shell
in Nigeria, Texaco in Ecuador, and Coca-Cola in Colombia. As described by Shamir (2004), com-
panies quickly mobilized in response, led by the International Chamber of Commerce and a spe-
cialized group calledUSAEngage, which included ExxonMobil, Dow, Caterpillar,Monsanto, and
others. Though it is difficult to disentangle the effects of corporate lobbying from other jurispru-
dential debates, several court decisions have subsequently limited the use of the Alien Tort Claims
Act against companies, and an upcoming US Supreme Court decision is likely to gut it entirely.
Climate Change, Environmental Policy, and the Prospects for Compromise
It is also clear that American corporations have mobilized to inhibit a strong intergovernmental
response to climate change. This is likely one reason that there is a fragmented regime com-
plex for climate change (Keohane & Victor 2011) rather than a strong unified regime. Starting
in the early 1990s, fossil fuel companies and industry associations—most notably, the Global
Climate Coalition, which included ExxonMobil, General Motors, and the American Petroleum
Institute—supported climate change skeptics, waged public relations campaigns, and successfully
lobbied against US participation in the Kyoto Protocol. Several of the foundations that have sup-
ported the larger conservative mobilization on climate change, such as the Scaife and Koch family
foundations, are also rooted in the fossil fuels industry (Dunlap &McCright 2011). European fos-
sil fuel companies and the International Chamber of Commerce were also part of a transnational
antiregulatory industry coalition up through the mid-1990s (Meckling 2011).
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Corporate positions evolved and diverged over time, though. In Europe, BP and DuPont
became leaders of the International Climate Change Partnership, through which companies pro-
moted emissions trading over a carbon tax, influencing the eventual design of the Kyoto Protocol
and helping to make the European Union an avid supporter rather than a critic of carbon markets
(Meckling 2011). In what Levy & Spicer (2013, p. 668) call the “carbon compromise” period
(1999–2008), fossil fuel companies (especially in Europe) began looking for carbon market oppor-
tunities and investing in alternative energies, while insurance, financial, and branded consumer
products companies (e.g., Nike, Apple, and Coca-Cola) began taking positions on climate risks.
But then, in what Levy and Spicer (p. 670) call the “carbon impasse” period (starting in 2009),
corporate opposition to governmental and intergovernmental action strengthened. Alternative
energy initiatives withered under the credit crunch and declining fuel prices, and American fossil
fuel companies joined the offensive against the Obama administration’s cap-and-trade proposals.
Companies that had previously supported cap-and-trade, such as BP and ConocoPhillips, back-
tracked. Some information technology and telecommunications companies have become vocal
supporters of governmental action on climate change, while large energy companies seem to be
hedging their bets through ties to both denialist and low-carbon future positions (Peetz et al. 2017).
On the one hand, then, the research on climate change demonstrates how corporate mobi-
lization can affect the viability and approach of global governance. On the other hand, it reveals
evolving sectoral and national divisions that have divided the corporate community and fostered
a mix of opposition, strategic support, and acquiescence to the expansion of climate governance.
Research on other environmental regimes has revealed more about the mix of corporate op-
position and acquiescence to the expansion of global governance. Ovodenko (2016) notes that
oligopolistic industries, where a few large firms dominate, should have the power to fight off en-
vironmental rules, but that they also seem to be the site of most effective environmental treaties.
Pointing to the Montreal Protocol and the recently signed Minamata Convention on Mercury,
he argues that oligopolistic industries are better able to make technological innovations that allow
for smooth transitions to new rules and can provide effective infrastructures for governments to
implement changes. Thus, the Montreal Protocol effectively phased out CFCs but left exceptions
for the ozone-depleting pesticide methyl bromide, which is used in the more fragmented and
competitive strawberry farming industry (see also Gareau 2013).
When the Minamata Convention was proposed, it covered several toxic heavy metals: mer-
cury, lead, and cadmium. “Well-organized industrial sectors lobbied heavily against the treaty in
its original form” (Ovodenko 2016, p. 116) but then accepted a narrower version that restricted
industrial uses of mercury—in the production of chlorine, lamps, and cosmetics, for instance. The
World Chlorine Council appears not to have pushed strongly against controls, since manufac-
turers in some countries had already developed alternative technologies (Sun 2017). Meanwhile,
exceptions weremade for another major source of mercury pollution: themillions of artisanal gold
miners around the world. The upshot is that large and powerful corporations can impede broad
and stringent global rules like the original version of the Minamata Convention, but they may
also be willing to accept compromises that allow for predictable and profitable transitions, even
if these involve binding restrictions. Put differently, we might find binding global regulation—
of a watered-down but perhaps still meaningful sort—precisely where corporate power is most
concentrated.
Competition and Content
Whether companies will inhibit or strategically support the globalization of rules seems also to
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sometimes seek to globalize the rules that they already live with domestically in order to level
the playing field and “constrain-thy-neighbor,” but this leveling potential may not be enough.
She shows how British companies supported European Union directives that reduced managers’
ability to resist corporate takeovers, since they already faced this risk and saw the potential to
acquire companies elsewhere in the European Union. German companies derided the directives
as neoliberal infringements on their autonomy and opposed them (see also Callaghan 2018). But
when it came toEUdirectives onworker participation,German andBritish companies were united
in opposition, even though German firms already had high levels of worker participation through
the codetermination/works council system. Supporting the worker participation directive would
have raised costs for their European competitors, but German companies feared that the directive
would also reduce their autonomy in operating (or moving) abroad and empower labor at home.
Thus, whether companies inhibited or supported the globalization of a rule depended on the
competitive potentials and issue-based threats—and, in this case at least, class-based threats—
carried in the rule itself. Put differently, both a relatively unified transnational capitalist class and a
divided set of competing national economies may coexist, with each being activated by a particular
episode of rule-making. This idea may help to span the gap between research in comparative
politics and the transnational capitalist class thesis, and it deserves further investigation.
PROVIDERS: THE RISE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY
In addition to supporting or inhibiting intergovernmental agreements, TNCs have become direct
providers of global governance, covering issues from finance, to food safety, to environmental
justice and labor rights. This is described in burgeoning multidisciplinary literatures on global
private authority, transnational private regulation, voluntary sustainability standards, and corpo-
rate social responsibility (Auld et al. 2008, Bu¨the & Mattli 2011, Cutler et al. 1999, Quark 2013,
Tsutsui & Lim 2015, Vogel 2008).
Through private governance, companies can create harmonized standards without government
action (Bu¨the&Mattli 2011),manage risks and preserve their brand reputations (for quality, safety,
sustainability, or fairness) (Hatanaka et al. 2005), respond to naming and shaming campaigns by
social movements (Bartley et al. 2015, McDonnell et al. 2015), and/or meet investors’ growing
demand for environmental, social, and governance indicators (Barman 2016). The failure of in-
tergovernmental agreements and rise of neoliberal prescriptions have facilitated the growth of
private governance by channeling institution-building to the private sector in a variety of ways
(Bartley 2007).
Finance
Global financial markets would seemingly be inoperable without private forms of governance.
Rating agencies, such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, essentially regulate the debt of cor-
porations as well as national and municipal governments (Carruthers 2013, Sinclair 2005). The
global market for derivatives depends heavily on the International Swaps and Derivatives Associa-
tion’s Master Agreement, a striking technology of private governance (Riles 2009). Similarly, the
London Interbank Offered Rate was a privately managed indicator, though it was subjected to
greater public oversight after recent manipulation scandals (see Angeletti 2017).
Researchers have paid particular attention to the rise of global accounting standards. Pro-
fessional bodies formed an International Accounting Standards Committee in 1973, after several
failed attempts to harmonize accountingmethods through intergovernmental arenas. A key change
occurred in 2001, when this was transformed into the International Accounting Standards Board
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(IASB), governed more by large accounting firms than by national professional bodies (Botzem
& Quack 2006). The so-called Big Four accounting firms took on an especially central role, con-
tributing roughly 60% of financial support and having former executives in four of the twelve
seats on the governing board (No¨lke & Perry 2007, Perry & No¨lke 2005). Initially hesitant, EU
authorities endorsed the IASB standards in 2005, apparently seeing them as preferable to the glob-
alization of the American approach (Farrell & Newman 2014). Yet the IASB standards veer more
toward an Anglo-American model, and Bu¨the & Mattli (2011) find that American firms have
had the greatest influence over the IASB. This is not because of sheer power, they argue, but
because the American system (via the Financial Accounting Standards Board) has a hierarchical
structure that matches the IASB, while the European system was more fragmented. In a different
domain—namely, technical product standards—Bu¨the andMattli find that European systems have
provenmore congruent with and thusmore influential on the InternationalOrganization for Stan-
dardization. By this account, even while private governance has fostered convergence on global
standards, domain-specific national institutional differences have determined which corporations’
standards have been globalized.
Food Safety
Studies of global food systems point to the rise of large supermarkets as de facto regulators of
quality, safety, and sustainability in agricultural operations around the world (Busch& Bain 2004).
In fact, Clapp&Burnett (2013) argue that whileWTOnegotiations on agriculture have stagnated,
private actors have become the key players in governing global agriculture. The concentration
of food retailing, especially in Europe and increasingly in the United States as well, means that
companies such as Carrefour, Tesco, and Wal-Mart have a tremendous amount of power over
suppliers, and the growth of private-label brands and direct sourcing means that there are fewer
intermediaries between supermarkets and farmers around the world (Hamilton et al. 2011).
Food safety standards are routinely incorporated into contracts between retailers and their sup-
pliers, who are often asked to get third party certification to demonstrate their compliance with
the predominant hazard analysis and critical control points (HACCP) approach (Hatanaka et al.
2005). Governments have also adopted the HACCP approach, but they typically use risk-based
oversight approaches, focusing on risky operations and accepting private certification (e.g., by
GlobalG.A.P. or the British Retail Consortium) as an indicator of low risk (Verbruggen 2013). It
remains a challenge to cover complex agro-food networks, and safety lapses still occur, but food
safety standards have imposed strict discipline on farmers and manufacturers around the world.
The high cost of standards canmarginalize small producers, but there is also evidence of producers
coping with and leveraging food safety standards. Perez-Aleman (2013) shows how dairy cooper-
atives in Nicaragua learned new food safety systems and upgraded their capacities, and Coslovsky
(2014) shows how Bolivian firms used food safety standards to become the dominant producers
of so-called Brazil nuts. For governments in the Global South, the food safety standards imposed
by dominant companies, importing countries, and the WTO have scientized risk management in
complex, and perhaps contradictory ways (Epstein 2014).
Sustainability and Labor Standards
Large supermarkets have also been essential to the rise of sustainability standards and the main-
streaming of organic and fair trade certification (Barrientos & Smith 2007, Bartley et al. 2015,
Fuchs & Kalfagianni 2010, Raynolds 2009). As Schurman & Munro (2009) show, the highly
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(genetically modified organism) activists and led to GMOs being effectively banned in the British
market through the policies retailers adopted. The more fragmented supermarket sector in the
United States, in contrast, proved much less receptive.
More broadly, environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have used a combina-
tion of activist campaigns, corporate partnerships, and public scorecards to convince large retailers
and manufacturers to support sustainability standards and join multi-stakeholder initiatives, in
which NGOs also have a seat at the table. Wal-Mart and McDonald’s agreed to promote cer-
tification to the Marine Stewardship Council’s standards for seafood, for instance, while Nestle
and L’Oreal promised to get suppliers certified to the standards of the Roundtable on Sustainable
Palm Oil (Auld 2014, Ponte 2012).
It is becoming clear that even the most credible multi-stakeholder initiatives rely heav-
ily on participating companies to push standards through their supply chains (Bartley 2018,
Vandenbergh 2007). Through contracts that demand compliance or incentives for certification,
large retailers and brands end up being the primary enforcers of sustainability standards, evenwhen
there is oversight by multi-stakeholder groups and independent auditors. The Forest Stewardship
Council, despite its serious commitment to multi-stakeholder governance, has relied heavily on
companies such as IKEA, B&Q, and Stora Enso to promote—and sometimes subsidize—the cer-
tification of forest management operations (Bartley 2018). Researchers have argued that corporate
dependence limits what voluntary standards can accomplish ( Jaffee 2012, Moog et al. 2015), but
there is also evidence of some initiatives, particularly the Forest StewardshipCouncil and Fairtrade
International, preserving their stringency in the face of industry pressure (Child 2015, Overdevest
2010, Raynolds 2017).
TNCs have also become direct providers of global labor standards and purported protectors
of human rights (Anner 2012, Bair 2017, Locke 2013, Seidman 2007, Tsutsui & Lim 2015).
Following a wave of anti-sweatshop activism in the late 1990s, apparel, footwear, and toy brands
in North America and Europe adopted codes of conduct (or ethical sourcing policies) for their
global supply chains and began monitoring compliance, sometimes with help from auditing firms
or multi-stakeholder initiatives. This soon spread to the electronics, food, and mining industries,
spurring growing fields of practice (and research) focused on corporate social responsibility. The
UN’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and related Global Compact initiative
have garnered support from thousands of companies around the world, though it is a much smaller
number of branded TNCs (e.g., Nike, H&M, the Gap, HP, Marks & Spencer) that have been
central to more rigorous multi-stakeholder compliance and capacity-building projects (Locke
2013, Tsutsui & Lim 2015).
Much research has focused on the rise of global corporate social responsibility, its market and
political underpinnings, and a debate about whether it is predominantly a reflection of neoliber-
alism or an extension of prior forms of institutionalized social solidarity (see Brammer et al. 2012,
Tsutsui & Lim 2015). To the extent that researchers have looked at these rules on the ground,
they have often found low-quality auditing, evasion by suppliers, weak enforcement of collective
rights, and poor coverage of subcontractors (Anner 2012, Nadvi & Raj-Reichert 2015, Seidman
2007). A growing body of research is identifying some conditions under which compliance is
more plausible (Distelhorst et al. 2015, Toffel et al. 2015) and several pathways to improvement
(Esbenshade 2012, Locke 2013, Oka 2016), but nearly always within the constraints of TNCs’
demand for low prices and quick deliveries. In recent work (Bartley 2018), I have compared land
and labor standards as implemented in Indonesia and China, finding that both fair labor and sus-
tainable forestry standards are of limited significance and are altered by the domestic context, but
that labor standards have been especially troubled.
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A Substantive Typology of Rules
Strikingly, the existing research portrays some private rules as revolutionizing production and
tightly controlling their targets, while other rules are met with evasion, weak oversight, and only
modest reforms. As I argue in Bartley (2018), we can get some purchase on the reasons with a
simple typology of rules and the consequent preferences of TNCs. While presented here to help
explain private rule enforcement, this typology may also help to organize the larger literature on
global regulation, which has often trumpeted the explosion of rules without differentiating their
contents (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson 2006, Schneiberg & Bartley 2008).
First, the primary purpose of rules may be either to coordinate or restrict markets. Market-
coordinating rules seek to harmonize divergent national approaches and thus expand markets, as
seen in accounting, quality, and technical standards.Market-restricting rules seek to limit activities
that might be profitable but that would expose consumers, workers, or residents to serious hazards,
as seen in product safety, labor, and environmental standards. TNCs usually have a strong interest
in market-coordinating standards. They often get enmeshed in conflicts about whose standards
should be globalized, as seen above, but they rarely questionwhether global standards are desirable.
TNCs’ interests inmarket-restricting standards, however, tend to be indirect and defensive. Firms
would prefer more autonomy, but they recognize in some circumstances that standards may help
them manage risks to their reputations and market positions.
Second, rules might seek to affect the product or the production process. Quality, safety, and
interoperability standards typically focus on products, while labor standards, most environmental
standards (except those focused on the health implications of a product), and even accounting
standards focus on the production process—that is, on how workers are treated, how natural
resources are managed, or how profits are calculated. The “product versus process” distinction
has been much debated inWTO jurisprudence (see Kysar 2004), but its importance to the current
discussion is simply that it shapes where the hazards of noncompliance tend to be felt. For product-
focused rules (such as food safety), hazards travel along with the product to the end-consumer
and can usually be easily linked to the seller or maker of the product. For rules that focus on
the production process, though, the hazards of noncompliance largely stay near the point of
production, in hazardous workplaces, polluted local environments, and degraded landscapes, for
instance. Here, TNCs may have an interest in minimizing bad publicity and protecting their
brands, but given the distant and indirect links to the possible damage, this interest can easily be
trumped by other business priorities.
Crossing these two dimensions, it is not hard to see why TNCs have adopted but not always
vigorously enforced market-restricting rules focused on the production process (e.g., labor and
sustainability standards). Stringent enforcement would reduce a company’s autonomy, and the risk
management benefits would be comparatively fuzzy and distant. TNCs tend to take a stronger
interest when market-restricting rules are focused on the products themselves, as with product
safety standards. These still reduce corporate autonomy but also help to manage potentially direct
and severe risks. TNCs should most vigorously promote market-coordinating rules, perhaps re-
gardless of whether they pertain to products or production practices, since these carry the prospect
of market growth. This simple typology points out the importance of differentiating rule-making
projects and helps to make sense of their varied outcomes.
IMPLICATIONS
Though dispersed over different fields and topics, existing research shows that corporations play
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implication is that researchers should be cautious about focusing on one role without recognizing
the others. In particular, in the enthusiasm to understand TNCs as the new providers of global
rules, scholars of corporate social responsibility and sustainability seem to forget that companies
have also worked to inhibit intergovernmental rules in the same domains. Or, in the desire to
portray companies as seeking a freewheeling and unregulated global economy, scholars may forget
that companies have sponsored sweeping and binding rules for trade and intellectual property
protection. Market-making requires rule-making, but it is rule-making of a particular sort, and
other rules tend to be broken or prevented in the process. Going forward, it would be useful to
study the mix of roles in a sample of MNCs and TNCs, as well as their positions on the relevant
issues, rather than having separate bodies of research on each role.
Second, it should be clear that corporations are important and privileged players in global
governance arenas but do not fully control them. Some corporate mobilizations to shape the
WTO, for instance, have succeeded, while others have fallen short. Companies have helped to
defeat or cripple some intergovernmental treaties but in other cases have had to accept significant
compromises. There are several hints in the existing literature about when and how corporations
gain the upper hand: CEO groups seem to be more flexible and effective than traditional industry
associations. Oligopolistic industries may be especially capable of defanging or redirecting pro-
posed rules but also more likely to accept compromises. And national divisions seem more likely
to be set aside for the sake of corporate unity when proposed rules threaten corporate autonomy
and do not clearly advantage powerful firms in one country over another. But there is room for
far more research on the conditions for corporate capture or compromise in global governance
arenas. Systematic comparisons of issue domains, industries, and time periods would be especially
important for a reinvigorated sociology of global corporate political action. In addition, engaging
with a growing literature on global professions (e.g., Dezalay & Garth 2002, Quack 2010) should
help scholars of corporations make sense of the processes through which particularistic interests
become legitimate forms of expertise on the global stage.
Third, substance matters. As discussed above, the content of a rule-making project appears
to influence whether companies will treat it as an opportunity to level the playing field against
foreign competitors or as an industry-wide or class-wide threat to be defeated. In addition, the
content of rules—that is, whether they coordinate or restrict markets and pertain to products or
production processes—seems to shape the depth of companies’ investment in providing global
rules themselves. Far more research is needed to assess the simple typology sketched above and
to identify exactly when corporations perceive global rules as threats or strategic opportunities.
More generally, only by avoiding formalistic accounts of global social structure anddigging into the
substance of debates are scholars likely to explain variation in global rule-making and enforcement.
Finally, it is worthwhile askingwhether the roles rub off. For instance, do corporationswhohave
embraced the private provision of global governance become more likely than their competitors
to support stringent and binding governmental regulation and intergovernmental agreements?
On the one hand, there are some hints that they might. Nike broke with the American Chamber
of Commerce in not opposing China’s labor contract law of 2007 (So 2010), and Carrefour,
B&Q, and IKEA supported the EU Timber Regulation of 2010, which penalizes the sale of
illegally harvested forest products (Leipold et al. 2016). Perhaps private governance is helping to
create a new global corporate liberal block that will do less to impede intergovernmental rules for
environment, labor, and consumer safety. On the other hand, there is also evidence that companies
that embrace voluntary provision of global governance will resist even seemingly minor moves
toward legal obligation. TheEU’sNon-Financial ReportingDirectivemerelymandates particular
forms of sustainability and corporate social responsibility reporting for large, publicly traded firms.
IKEA and Unilever—two firms central to global private governance—publicly supported it, but
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hundreds of other firms that engaged in voluntary reporting nevertheless fought against this
mandate, ultimately weakening the law’s substance and scope (Kinderman 2016).
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